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1. INTRODUCTION 
The typical engineer’s dream is designing a 
machine that will not have to interact with a human. 
If it is a nightmare, it presents an ordinary human 
who looks like unintelligent and prone to errors, 
which are more often than not unforgivable 
violations. Conversely, the typical ergonomist’s 
dream is designing work situations where the 
humans can do everything they want without any 
constraints, interpreted as workload and intolerable 
knowledge requirements. The first dream — the 
engineer’s one — is a caricature of machine centred 
design, and the second — the ergonomist’s one — 
is a caricature of human centred design. As usual, 
the truth is in between that tries to reach a design 
conception centred on the Human-Machine System 
(HMS). 
The notion of HMS is very old in ergonomics 
(e.g., Chapanis, 1965). Nevertheless it has been 
sometimes forgotten and sometimes retrieved. Its 
benefit consists in putting the “system” at the right 
place, not exclusively on the machine side but 
surrounding the two kinds of component — human 
and machine. Adopting this systemic point of view 
enables the designer to consider a task that is 
performed by the overall HMS, before defining the 
subtasks or functions allocated to each component. 
This kind of approach was re-activated slightly 
more than twenty years ago by E. Hollnagel and 
D.D. Woods (1983) who introduced the notion of 
Joint Cognitive System within the context of 
cognitive ergonomics and cognitive engineering, 
the former dealing with the role of the human, the 
latter with the role of the machine in the HMS. 
Human scientists like E. Hutchins in his studies on 
airline cockpits have very well defended such a 
position. The Hutchins’ expression (1995) “How a 
cockpit remember its speed?” is a good illustration 
of the importance of the HMS notion. In this 
particular case, what is crucial is the fact that the 
cockpit must memorise its speed, before choosing 
the particular location of the memory within the 
HMS, in the pilot’s head, in the computer silicon, or 
both. As a matter of fact, redundancy between the 
human and the machine is often a design quality 
criterion, especially in order to insure mutual 
control between the two agents, or dynamic task 
allocation, for example in the case of unavailability 
of one of the agents. 
People working within the industrial or 
transportation domains more often use the word 
“machine”, with a reference to cybernetics, whereas 
those who are working in close interaction with 
computer science are obviously prone to use the 
word “computer”. Because the first studies on 
human-machine interaction have mainly concerned 
computers, the terminology adopted for this domain 
is Human-Computer Interaction (HCI), associated 
to several well-known conferences. However, this 
difference in terminology should not mask an 
essential distinction between two types of situation 
where HMS can be encountered — static and 
dynamic situations (Hoc, 1993). 
HCI studies have been mainly devoted to static 
situations for which computer science has 
developed various products. The static feature of a 
situation is defined from the HMS point of view. It 
is related to the fact that the HMS fully controls the 
situation. In other words, no modification can 
appear in the situation without being produced by 
the HMS itself. Typical examples can be found in 
clerical work. Computer science, as well as 
cognitive ergonomics or psychology of problem 
solving, have very often focused on static 
situations. It is the kingdom of “computerization”. 
With the introduction of new technology in the 
factory, the aircraft, the train, the car, etc., another 
kingdom has been opened, that of “automatization”, 
in relation to automation, rather than computer. A 
huge amount of research effort has been devoted to 
the relation between human and automation, 
especially within the community organised at the 
meeting point between cognitive ergonomics, 
cognitive engineering and human engineering. 
Although the term has unfortunately felt into 
disuse, this research trend is more related to 
cybernetics — the science of dynamic systems, 
whatever their natural or artificial nature. It is 
mainly concerned by dynamic situations, from the 
HMS point of view in that the HMS controls the 
situation only partially. The HMS actions are 
combined with other factors that are hidden or 
unexpected. In other words the HMS actions are not 
sufficient to fully determine what happens. 
Confronted with the increasing development of 
automation within the dynamic situations, the HCI 
domain has been progressively enlarging in order to 
integrate the two kinds of situation. In the 
following, I will concentrate myself on the dynamic 
situations and argue that the development of more 
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and more “intelligent” automation leads to enrich 
the notion of interaction by adopting the 
cooperation point of view. If one considers that 
intelligence is the capability of a cognitive agent to 
adapt to novel situations, strictly speaking machine 
intelligence has been rapidly increasing for several 
tens of years. Besides, intelligence is not only a 
property of computer science products, but also a 
property of automation. The increasing intelligence 
of automatic devices enables them to be 
autonomous. This has led some engineers to dream 
of a full automated world. Nevertheless, the 
optimisation of a HMS is far from being 
systematically found in a suppression of the human 
component. Even apparently fully automated the 
French underground VAL (in Lille, Rennes, and 
Toulouse) does not work when there is a strike! 
Obviously, the first product of intelligent 
automation is the design of almost autonomous 
devices that have the status of cognitive agents with 
which humans must deal. Human and artificial 
agents cooperate de facto, in the strict and minimal 
sense of operating together within the same 
environment, that of the HMS. We will see later 
that a stronger sense should be given to 
cooperation. 
The relations between human and automation 
have been studied for a long time. Some of these 
approaches are of interest in order to introduce the 
cooperation topic, those that deal with the 
consequences of function allocation between the 
human and the machine. We will restrict ourselves 
on one of the well-known approach to this problem, 
because it has inspired recent experimental studies 
within the domain. It was the Sheridan’s approach 
of Levels Of Automation (LOA: Sheridan & 
Verplanck, 1978). After stressing the limits of this 
kind of approach, as well as its interest, we will 
justify the introduction of a functional point of view 
of cooperation, going beyond the sole function 
allocation problem. Then, we will describe three 
Levels Of Cooperation (LOC) in terms of 
cooperative activities, added to the private 
activities, that is to say in terms very different from 
LOA. And LOA will be replaced by a typology of 
cooperative situations in terms of Modes Of 
Cooperation (MOC). Finally, some implications of 
this cooperation point of view will be delineated, 
from a theoretical as well practical point of view. 
This presentation will be illustrated by some 
examples coming from our own studies on air-
traffic control and car driving support. 
2. LEVELS OF AUTOMATION 
The Sheridan’s LOA typology (Sheridan & 
Verplanck, 1978) describes the full range of 
automation, from fully manual control to fully 
automated control.  The intermediary steps are 
formulated in terms of symbolic information 
processing from supporting solution generation to 
supporting solution execution. Some examples of 
steps are the following. 
– The machine proposes alternatives among 
which the human must make a choice and 
execute (decision support with weak guidance). 
– The machine suggests a particular alternative, 
which the human will implement (decision 
support with strong guidance). 
– The machine suggests a particular alternative, 
which the human approves before the 
execution by the machine (decision and 
implementation support). 
– The machine makes the decision, implements 
it, and let the human informed afterwards 
(human supervision). 
This approach has generated several studies, 
which cannot be accounted in detail. For example, 
Endsley and Kaber (1999) have found that the HMS 
performance is improved when the machine 
provides the human with an implementation 
support, but only in normal situations. During 
automation malfunction periods, the human 
deprivation of implementation is not beneficial to 
performance. This kind of result is very often 
interpreted as a “human out of the loop” 
phenomenon leading to complacency (negligence of 
supervision of the delegated function) and loss of 
situation awareness. The same authors (Kaber & 
Endsley, 2004) have suggested that Adaptive 
Automation, using a dynamic function allocation 
principle, should be a way to fight against the 
undesired phenomenon. 
LOA essentially explains the function allocation 
from an engineering perspective — a machine 
centred one — without reference to the cognitive 
processes provoked in the human by the LOA. For 
example, what could be the effect of proposing 
alternatives? Would the human have time to choose 
among them? Would not the human systematically 
take the first alternative that is proposed? In order 
to answer these kinds of question, we need a model 
of the interaction processes between the human and 
the machine. We will see later than these processes 
can be considered as cooperative activities. Another 
limitation of the LOA approach in its genuine 
presentation is its restriction to symbolic 
information processing. In cognitive science, the 
term symbolic qualifies information that is not 
restricted to its physical features when it is 
processed. A good example is given by language 
and any kinds of codes behind which the meaning 
is processed rather than what is perceived. From a 
psychological point of view, symbolic activities are 
costly, must be executed sequentially, step by step, 
and so on. In order to enable low costs and 
parallelism, the humans develop routines by doing. 
These routines are sub-symbolic in that they can 
process the surface features of information without 
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needing to access to the meaning. For example, at 
the beginning, traffic lights are processed as 
symbolic information, red meaning that we must 
stop, green that we may go ahead. After experience, 
the driver can react to the colour without processing 
its meaning, for example starting after perceiving a 
green flash, like a chemist’s green cross.  
This limitation to symbolic activities is not the 
specificity of LOA, it is also currently found in 
various approaches of cooperation. That is why, 
trying to enrich the LOA framework by the 
cooperation one, we will also try to cover the two 
kinds of process, symbolic as well as sub-symbolic 
activities. This covering is much more justified 
when studying human-automation than traditional 
human-computer interaction. As a matter of fact, a 
large part of dynamic situations covers sensori-
motor activities without direct implication of 
symbolic control (e.g., car trajectory control). 
However, the two kinds of activity are always 
operating in parallel and in interaction, symbolic 
control supervising sub-symbolic control and sub-
symbolic control returning information (emergence) 
to symbolic control (Hoc & Amalberti, in press). 
3. A FUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO 
COOPERATION 
The framework proposed by Hoc (2001) is based on 
a functional rather than structural approach and is 
not aimed at describing relational structures 
between cooperative agents, such as distribution of 
authority (Millot & Mandiau, 1995) or competen-
cies (Schmidt, 1991) between agents. Its main 
objectives are to identify, analyse, implement and 
support cooperative activities. These activities are 
considered to be additional to private activities 
when moving from an isolated individual activity to 
a collective activity. For example, function 
allocation is a cooperative activity and would be 
unnecessary if an agent was working alone. 
The framework proposes that cooperation is an 
activity of interference management between non-
independent tasks distributed among several agents. 
In line with Castelfranchi (1998), interference can 
be considered both as positive and negative. It 
reflects the fact that the goal of one particular agent 
has something to do with that of another agent, and 
each can either facilitate or disrupt the other. 
Interference is managed in order to facilitate the 
individual tasks or the collective task as it stands. 
Cooperation does not always imply a perfect 
symmetry between the diverse agents. Sometimes 
there are strong reasons for giving priority to the 
facilitation of one particular agent’s task. For 
example, in-car human-machine cooperation is 
supposed to give priority to the driver’s task (at 
least in normal circumstances). 
In order to manage interference, the framework 
decomposes the cooperative activities involved into 
three levels. The first level is cooperation in action 
where the cooperation activity is directly related to 
action and corresponds to a local, concrete, and 
short-term interference. The second level is 
cooperation in planning where the cooperation 
activity is more remote from the concrete action 
and aims at maintaining a COmmon Frame Of 
Reference (COFOR) between the agents. The third 
level is meta-cooperation and consists in 
maintaining long-term models of oneself and of the 
partner, on the basis of training and experience. 
Thus, the levels are distributed along two 
confounded dimensions. The first one is the 
distance from the immediate action, in terms of 
abstraction. The second one is the temporal horizon 
covered by the cooperative activity. 
4. LEVELS OF COOPERATION 
4.1. ACTION LEVEL 
At the action level, interference management is 
restricted to the short term, with minimal 
anticipation of the agents’ goals. The positive or 
negative features of interference are highly relative 
to their products in terms of performance. 
Interference occurs when the tasks are not 
independent. This means that the tasks can be, for 
example, in precondition relations (one being 
necessary to perform another one), in interaction 
relations (the two being performed simultaneously), 
or in redundancy relations (the same goal can be 
reached by any of the agents). Interference can take 
the form of mutual control when an agent checks 
another agent’s activity to give back an evaluation 
(e.g., a warning). So, interference is not always 
negative, it can be deliberately instigated to 
improve effectiveness. After its appearance at the 
action level, interference can also trigger 
cooperative activities at the other cooperation levels 
(e.g., common plan elaboration in order to resolve 
interference on a longer term basis). 
In a simulator study of cooperation between two 
air-traffic radar controllers, cooperation in action 
has been positively evaluated (Hoc & Carlier, 
2002). The main aim of this experiment was 
identifying the cooperation skill to be integrated in 
an automatic conflict resolution device. One third 
of the cooperation activities at this level consisted 
in mutual control between the two controllers. And 
another one third was devoted to communications 
aiming at making easier the anticipation of the 
partner’s imminent goal. Negative aspects of 
cooperation in action only concerned one third of 
the cooperative activities in action (detection and 
resolution of unanticipated interference. A possible 
explanation of this efficient cooperation in action 
 4 
was the adequate maintenance of a common frame 
of reference between the partners (see below). 
The removal of interference during the course of 
action can be considered as a means of reducing 
workload. The other levels of cooperative activities, 
because of their ability to abstract and to anticipate, 
are likely to restrict interference in action, that is to 
say to resolve it beforehand. However, the 
cooperative activities, at whatever level, are also a 
means of adapting to unforeseen situations, and so 
interference is sometimes desirable. For instance, 
mutual control is recommended in aircraft cockpits 
because every possible error produced by a 
complex interaction between the agent, the machine 
and the situational context, cannot be anticipated 
(Wiener, Kanki, & Helmreich, 1993). Initial (pre-
task) planning in order to render the diverse agents’ 
tasks independent (and hence minimise 
interference) thus has a limited validity. Some 
workload cost (in terms of real time interference 
management) must therefore be paid to gain 
adaptation power. 
4.2. PLAN LEVEL 
At the plan level, interference is managed at a more 
abstract and anticipative level, and depends on the 
elaboration and maintenance of a common frame of 
reference (COFOR). Roughly, a COFOR is 
composed of shared representations (between the 
agents), which help to facilitate the activities 
situated at the action level. In fact, these 
representations are complementary rather than 
identical – that is to say different but non-
contradictory. It is a common fact in ergonomics 
that each agent must be assisted by external 
representations that are presented in a suitable 
format for this particular agent’s action. Thus, the 
same “abstract” information must be presented 
differently to several agents in relation to their own 
tasks. 
COFOR does not only include representations 
of the environment (team situation awareness), but 
also of the team’s activity (e.g., common plans and 
goals, function allocation, etc.). It is easy to create 
conditions for shared awareness of the external 
situation, although the information format must be 
suitable. On the other hand, it is much more 
difficult to maintain a shared representation of the 
team’s activity or goals – for example, whether the 
machine can recognise the human’s intentions. 
Communication between the agents in the system is 
a crucial component of developing and maintaining 
an effective COFOR.  The humans must 
communicate their intent to the machine via their 
actions; the machine must similarly communicate 
its status and activities to the humans.  Only 
through these clear and open communications can 
situation awareness be truly shared and the 
interaction optimised. Obviously, the automatic 
devices cannot be valid in any circumstances, 
especially because of the high environment 
complexity. A poor situation awareness can be the 
major cause of difficulty to return to manual control 
— a problem frequently mentioned in human-
automation studies. 
The importance of COFOR maintenance in 
cooperation has been stressed in the study of air-
traffic control cited above (Hoc & Carlier, 2002). 
As a matter of fact, almost 80% of the cooperative 
activities consisted in maintaining or elaborating 
the COFOR. Almost the two thirds of the 
cooperative activities at this level aimed at 
maintaining or elaborating the part of the COFOR 
representing the team’s activity as opposed to the 
external situation under control. 
4.3. META LEVEL 
At the meta level, the experience of cooperation 
within the team is exploited to facilitate the 
activities of the previous levels – for example, by 
using models of the other agents and of oneself. At 
this level, trust in automation and in one’s relations 
with automation, together with self-confidence, can 
be calibrated through the use of models elaborated 
by experience (Lee & See, 2004; Muir, 1994). The 
lack of appropriate model of the machine can lead 
to an over-generalisation, so that the machine can 
be utilised outside its validity domain. Last, but not 
the least, an inappropriate machine model can lead 
to automation surprises, which have been well 
documented in the aviation domain (Funk et al., 
1999; Sarter & Woods, 1992). 
In a study of the use of an active steering 
device, automatically assuming the car lateral 
control function, the importance of this meta-level 
has been stressed (Hoc et al., 2006). At the 
beginning, more than 40% of the drivers’ verbal 
reports denoting human-machine cooperation 
activities concerned the elaboration of models of 
the machine operation and of the human-machine 
interaction while performing the task. 
5. MODES OF COOPERATION 
5.1. PERCEPTIVE MODE 
In the perceptive mode, the machine is utilised as 
an extension of the sensorial organs. In terms of 
engineering, this is the instrumented mode. 
Although the production of a physical measure is a 
well-defined task for an engineer, the usefulness of 
this measure for the human is questionable. 
Symbolic processing is serial and, therefore, very 
costly in terms of attentional resources. In addition, 
the information that is processed is discrete and not 
continuous, and this is not compatible with 
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smoothness of action. In any case, the perception 
mode must be considered as a cooperation mode 
since it is designed to interfere with the human’s 
activity. It is mainly a question of choosing the best 
human-machine interface, either in terms of an 
appropriate code (form/content) to support 
symbolic processing or an efficient sensorial 
modality to easily trigger action. 
The distinction between symbolic and 
subsymbolic visual information has been stressed in 
a car-driving study of the effect of hazard road 
signs when approaching bends (Milleville, Hoc, & 
Jolly, in press). Road signs revealed an effect on 
symbolic information processing, triggered by 
explicit processing such as a verbal evaluation of 
hazard or of curvature. However, there was no 
effect on subsymbolic information processing, 
triggered by implicit processing underlying the 
concrete production of a steering wheel angle. More 
especially, the road signs did not reduce the well-
known bias of high curvatures underestimation. In 
another fixed-base simulator study, Milleville 
(2006) has inserted black bands both on the top and 
the bottom of the windscreen, these bands being 
submitted to tilts in bends in relation to the virtual 
lateral acceleration. When the participants were not 
informed of this modification of the visual 
framework, analogue to what they could see in a 
real tilting car, reduced their speed. Thus, the 
subsymbolic processing of the visual information 
was efficient. However, when the participants were 
informed beforehand, not only this effect was not 
observed but the reverse. The participants increased 
their speed interpreting the information as an 
illusion without relation to safety. 
5.2. MUTUAL CONTROL MODE 
In the mutual control mode, the machine is 
designed in such a way that it can interpret 
information in terms of limits to be respected in 
relation to risk assessment. The concept of mutual 
control is very different from shared control, which 
simply denotes the fact that several agents control 
an external situation at the same time, but not 
necessarily each other. Thus, for example in car 
driving, a device can provide drivers with feedback 
on their actions (mutual control) in terms of 
exceeding limits. Three sub-modes can be 
envisioned, all with different degrees of 
invasiveness.  
The warning mode and the action suggestion 
mode are restricted to (interpreted) information 
transfer, without any action taken on the vehicle 
itself. Here, warning is not taken in the sense of 
information provided on a technical state (e.g., a 
fault), but as a criticism of the human’s actions. The 
warning mode has also been evaluated in critical 
situations while taking a bend in order to avoid lane 
departure. Suzuki and Jansson (2003) have shown 
that auditory warning and steering wheel vibration 
were efficient in reducing response time and 
maximum lateral deviation in critical situations, but 
only in comparison with other types of support and 
not with a control situation (without support).  
More recent experiments (Hoc et al., 2006; 
Navarro, Mars, Hoc, Boisliveau, & Vienne, 2006) 
have qualified this conclusion, in comparison with a 
control situation, on the basis of the delay in 
returning to the lane centre, showing that the mode 
(lateralised sound in the direction of the deviation 
and steering wheel vibration) might only be 
efficient within certain contexts. Especially, the 
effect of the warning was modulated by the driver’s 
risk evaluation.  
When the warning mode is present on a control 
(e.g., a pedal or wheel), by using the haptic 
modality it could become an action suggestion and, 
therefore, could be more effective in emergency 
situations, acting as motor priming. In the study 
cited above, Suzuki and Jansson (2003) have 
evaluated this kind of mode by means of the 
application of torque to the steering wheel. The 
results were not conclusive because, for some 
participants, the stimulation produced the opposite 
effect. Hoc et al. (2006) implemented the 
suggestion mode by an asymmetric vibration on the 
steering wheel, triggering a response in the 
appropriate direction. Although the effect was 
positive, it was not significant due to the fact that 
individual differences were greater than for the 
warning mode. In addition, the stress produced by a 
road departure was likely to mask the effect of the 
action suggestion, underlining the importance of 
context in determining mode effectiveness. 
However, Navarro et al. (2006) found a clear-cut 
effect of motor priming by an asymmetric vibration 
of the steering wheel suggesting turning toward the 
correct direction in a simulator study. The effect of 
motor priming was much greater than auditory or 
haptic warning mode.  However, like the warning 
mode effect, the action suggestion mode effect was 
modulated by the driver’s risk evaluation.  Thus, in 
parallel with the direct (subsymbolic) effect of 
motor priming on action, there is a possible 
(symbolic) effect of diagnosis on the action level, 
capable of reducing or increasing the effect of 
motor priming. This result is important because 
triggering an irrepressible action in a wrong 
situation could create negative interference. 
The limit mode, although under the driver’s 
control, introduces more constraints, for example 
by creating pedal or wheel resistance. A fourth 
possibility (correction mode) would to let the driver 
go beyond the limit and then to make the required 
correction.  
An appropriate COFOR between the machine 
and the human is crucial in order to sustain the 
mutual control mode. 
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5.3. FUNCTION DELEGATION MODE 
The cooperation modes considered under the 
function delegation category go beyond simple 
mutual control. They correspond to a lasting 
function delegation from the human to the machine. 
In the mediatized mode, the machine takes a control 
as an order to be implemented using a procedure 
that covers a certain period of time. In the control 
mode, the machine controls a parameter, thus 
allowing the human to take charge of the others. 
There is also a need for an efficient COFOR 
maintenance. An extreme case is the fully 
automated mode. Within the limited framework of 
this paper it will not be discussed separately. 
The function delegation mode has been widely 
studied in the literature on human and automation, 
as well as the full automation mode (see below). 
Several kinds of drawbacks of automation, when it 
interacts with humans, have been identified (Hoc, 
2000; Parasuraman & Riley, 1997). Mainly four 
“automation biases” have been described. 
- Loss of expertise due to the lack of exercise of 
the function delegated to the machine. 
- Complacency, which could be interpreted as 
neglecting to gather information necessary to 
the function fulfilment, and/or neglecting to 
supervise the automated function, and/or 
neglecting to improve the performance of the 
automated function. This phenomenon has 
been identified in a study of cooperation 
between air-traffic controllers and an automatic 
conflict resolution device (Hoc & Lemoine, 
1998). When the humans feel themselves 
responsible for the function allocation between 
them and the machine, they exert mutual 
control on the machine. In the opposite case, 
they are complacent and do not supervise the 
machine. 
- Bad-calibrated trust due to the lack of an 
adequate model of the machine (or of the 
interaction). 
- Loss of adaptability due to an insufficient 
feedback returned to the human (i.e., the best 
adaptive agent in the team), either on the 
machine operation or on the machine’s 
situation awareness. 
Loss of expertise, complacency, and loss of 
adaptability contribute to the well-known difficulty 
of returning to manual control. Designers very often 
underestimate this issue when they are too much 
focusing on the machine. Nevertheless any machine 
is designed to be efficient within a defined validity 
envelope. More often than not the human remains 
within the human-machine system in order to take 
the control when the situation leaves the envelope. 
In the study cited on active steering in car driving, 
Hoc et al. (2006) have interpreted the difficulty to 
return to manual control in relation to complacency, 
on the basis of a negligence of visual information 
needed for manual lateral control. 
6. CONCLUSION 
In the cognitive ergonomics literature, the 
description of the automation biases has been 
prominent for several tens of years. Some effort has 
been devoted to the understanding of the causes of 
these biases and some countermeasures have been 
suggested, like introducing unexpected periods of 
manual control (especially in the line of the work 
done by Kaber and Endsley, 2004). However, much 
work remains to be done in order to define efficient 
and ecological countermeasures. For example, it is 
not sure that the voluntary introduction of failures 
in a machine is ecologically acceptable… Some 
efficient solutions could be found within the 
human-machine cooperation framework. 
First, we could introduce much more 
cooperation in action if we are able to reduce the 
cost and increase the effectiveness of the real time 
management of interference. Most of the time, 
designers consider human-machine interaction 
mainly at the symbolic information level. Indeed, 
engineers have symbolic representations of 
information to be transmitted to the humans and 
they are inclined to think that this kind of format is 
appropriate. However, a correct task analysis can 
prove that it is not true. Perceptual and 
sensorimotor interaction could be preferable in 
terms of efficiency. There are good examples of 
this benefit in car driving.  
Second, the sensorimotor level could also be 
very useful as a tool for efficient communications 
between the human and the machine, resulting to 
COFOR maintenance at low cost. In the reverse 
direction, communication from the human to the 
machine is costly for the human. Thus, we need to 
provide the machine with some capability of 
diagnosing the human state. Some progress has 
recently been done within the car-driving support 
domain, for example in order to trigger collision 
avoidance device in the right time and advisedly 
(e.g., Bellet, 2006). This kind of research should be 
developed further. Improving communication 
between the agents’ individual situation awareness 
is a way to improve the human-machine system’s 
situation awareness. However, this does not prevent 
from erroneous representations and from conflict 
resolution. 
Third, key to access to an appropriate trust in 
the machine and in the human-machine interaction 
is the elaboration by each partner of models of the 
others and of the interaction with the others. As 
machine intelligence, in terms of adaptive power, is 
growing, explicit teaching of appropriate models is 
absolutely necessary. This sets two questions: (a) 
the definition of simplified models, just sufficient 
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for their purpose; (b) the design of efficient 
training. These questions are particularly crucial for 
consumer electronics or software.  
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